1.00 PURPOSE OF REPORT

1.01 To provide members with a mid-year update on matters relating to the Council’s Treasury Management function.

2.00 BACKGROUND

2.01 Treasury management comprises the management of the Council’s cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.

2.02 The Council’s primary objectives for the investment of its surplus funds are to protect the principal sums invested from loss, and to ensure adequate liquidity so that funds are available for expenditure when needed. The generation of investment income to support the provision of local authority services is an important, but secondary, objective.

2.03 The Council’s policy is to appoint external consultants to provide advice on its treasury management function. In September 2016 Arlingclose Ltd were reappointed as the Council’s advisors for a period of 3 years, following a competitive tendering exercise.

2.04 The Council has adopted the 2012 edition of the CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice, which requires the Council to approve a treasury management strategy before the start of each financial year, a mid-year report, and an annual report after the end of each financial year.

2.05 In addition, the Welsh Government (WG) Guidance on Local Government Investments recommends that local authorities amend their investment strategies in light of changing internal or external circumstances.

2.06 This report fulfils the Council’s legal obligation under the Local Government Act 2003 to have regard to both the CIPFA Code and the WG Guidance.

2.07 The Council approved the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy at its meeting on 16th February 2016.
The preliminary estimate of Q2 2016 GDP showed reasonably strong growth as the economy grew 0.7% quarter-on-quarter, as compared to 0.4% in Q1 and year/year growth running at a healthy pace of 2.2%. However the UK economic outlook changed significantly on 23rd June 2016. The surprise result of the referendum on EU membership prompted forecasters to rip up previous projections and dust off worst-case scenarios. Growth forecasts had already been downgraded as 2016 progressed, as the very existence of the referendum dampened business investment, but the crystallisation of the risks and the subsequent political turmoil prompted a sharp decline in household, business and investor sentiment.

The repercussions of this plunge in sentiment on economic growth were judged by the Bank of England to be severe, prompting the Monetary Policy Committee to initiate substantial monetary policy easing at its August meeting to mitigate the worst of the downside risks. This included a cut in Bank Rate to 0.25%, further gilt and corporate bond purchases (QE) and cheap funding for banks (Term Funding Scheme) to maintain the supply of credit to the economy. The minutes of the August meeting also suggested that many members of the Committee supported a further cut in Bank Rate to near-zero levels (the Bank, however, does not appear keen to follow peers into negative rate territory) and more QE should the economic outlook worsen.

In response to the Bank of England’s policy announcement, money market rates and bond yields declined to new record lows. Since the onset of the financial crisis over eight years ago, Arlingclose’s rate outlook has progressed from ‘lower for longer’ to ‘even lower for even longer’ to, now, ‘even lower for the indeterminable future’.

The new members of the UK government, particularly the Prime Minister and Chancellor, are likely to follow the example set by the Bank of England. After six years of fiscal consolidation, the Autumn Statement on 23rd November is likely to witness fiscal initiatives to support economic activity and confidence, most likely infrastructure investment. Tax cuts or something similar cannot be ruled out.

Whilst the economic growth consequences of BREXIT remain speculative, there is uniformity in expectations that uncertainty over the UK’s future trade relations with the EU and the rest of the world will weigh on economic activity and business investment, dampen investment intentions and tighten credit availability, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. These effects will dampen economic growth through the second half of 2016 and in 2017.
Meanwhile, inflation is expected to pick up due to a rise in import prices, dampening real wage growth and real investment returns. The August Quarterly Inflation Report from the Bank of England forecasts a rise in CPI to 0.9% by the end of calendar 2016 and thereafter a rise closer to the Bank’s 2% target over the coming year, as previous rises in commodity prices and the sharp depreciation in sterling begin to drive up imported material costs for companies.

The rise in inflation is highly unlikely to prompt monetary tightening by the Bank of England, with policymakers looking through import-led CPI spikes, concentrating instead on the negative effects of Brexit on economic activity and, ultimately, inflation.

**Market reaction:** Following the referendum result gilt yields fell sharply across the maturity spectrum on the view that Bank Rate would remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. The yield on the 10-year gilt fell from 1.37% on 23rd June to a low of 0.52% in August, a quarter of what it was at the start of 2016. The 10-year gilt yield has since risen to 0.69% at the end of September. The yield on 2- and 3-year gilts briefly dipped into negative territory intra-day on 10th August to -0.1% as prices were driven higher by the Bank of England’s bond repurchase programme. However both yields have since recovered to 0.07% and 0.08% respectively. The fall in gilt yields was reflected in the fall in PWLB borrowing rates.

On the other hand, after an initial sharp drop, equity markets appeared to have shrugged off the result of the referendum and bounced back despite warnings from the IMF on the impact on growth from ‘Brexit’ as investors counted on QE-generated liquidity to drive risk assets.

The most noticeable fall in money market rates was for very short-dated periods (overnight to 1 month) where rates fell to between 0.1% and 0.2%
**Outlook for the remainder of 2016/17:**

The economic outlook for the UK has immeasurably altered following the popular vote to leave the EU. The long-term position of the UK economy will be largely dependent on the agreements the government is able to secure with the EU, particularly with regard to Single Market access.

The short to medium-term outlook has been more downbeat due to the uncertainty generated by the result and the forthcoming negotiations. Economic and political uncertainty will likely dampen or delay investment intentions, prompting lower activity levels and potentially a rise in unemployment. The downward trend in growth apparent on the run up to the referendum may continue through the second half of 2016, although some economic data has held up better than was initially expected, perhaps suggesting a less severe slowdown than feared.

Arlingclose has changed its central case for the path of Bank Rate over the next three years. Arlingclose believes any currency-driven inflationary pressure will be looked through by Bank of England policymakers. Arlingclose’s central case is for Bank Rate to remain at 0.25%, but there is a 40% possibility of a drop to close to zero, with a small chance of a reduction below zero.

Gilt yields are forecast to be broadly flat from current levels, albeit experiencing short-term volatility.

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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest Rate</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
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<td>0.25%</td>
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<td>0.25%</td>
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Global interest rate expectations have been pared back considerably. There remains a possibility that the Federal Reserve will wait until after November’s presidential election, and probably hike interest rates in December 2016 but only if economic conditions warrant.

In addition, Arlingclose believes that the Government and the Bank of England have both the tools and the willingness to use them to prevent market-wide problems leading to bank insolvencies. The cautious approach to credit advice means that the banks currently on the Authority’s counterparty list have sufficient equity buffers to deal with any localised problems in the short term.

**4.00 BORROWING REQUIREMENTS AND DEBT MANAGEMENT**

**4.01 PWLB (Public Works Loans Board) Certainty Rate Update.**
In August 2016, the Authority submitted its application to WG along with the 2016-17 Capital Estimates Return to access this reduced rate for a further 12 months from 1st November 2016.

4.02 The total long term borrowing outstanding, brought forward into 2016/17 totalled £251.3 million.

4.03 Loans with the Public Works Loans Board are in the form of fixed rate (£222.35m) and variable rate (£10m). The remaining £18.95m is variable in the form of Lobo’s (Lender’s Option, Borrower’s Option). The Council’s average borrowing rate is currently 5.01%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Balance 01/04/2016 £m</th>
<th>Debt Maturing £m</th>
<th>New Debt £m</th>
<th>Balance 30/09/2016 £m</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Term Borrowing</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>251.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BORROWING</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>251.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Long Term Liabilities *</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT</td>
<td>258.4</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>257.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase/ (Decrease) in Borrowing £m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.6</td>
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</table>

4.04 The Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) measures the Authority’s underlying need to borrow for a capital purpose. The calculation of the CFR is taken from the amounts held in the Balance Sheet relating to capital expenditure and financing.

4.05 No other new long term borrowing has been undertaken so far during 2016/17.

Affordability (interest costs charged on new loans) and the “cost of carry” (costs associated with new loans) remain important influences on the Council’s borrowing strategy alongside the consideration that, for any borrowing undertaken ahead of need, the proceeds would have to be invested in the money markets at rates of interest significantly lower than the cost of borrowing.

4.06 Loans at Variable Rates

The extent of variable rate borrowing the Council can potentially undertake is influenced by the level of Reserves and Balances. The interest rate on the Council’s £10m variable rate loans averaged 0.52%.

The Council has determined that exposure to variable rates is warranted. It also assists with the affordability and budgetary perspective in the short-to-medium term. Any upward movement in interest rates and interest paid on variable rate debt would be offset by a corresponding increase in interest earned on the Council’s variable rate investments. The interest rate risk associated with the Council’s strategic exposure of £10m is regularly reviewed with our treasury advisor.
against clear reference points, this being a narrowing in the gap between short and longer term interest rates. If appropriate, the exposure to variable interest rates will be reduced by switching into fixed rate loans.

4.07 Internal Borrowing

Given the significant cuts to local government funding putting pressure on Council finances, the strategy will be to minimise debt interest payments without compromising the longer-term stability of the portfolio.

The differential between the cost of new longer-term debt and the return generated on the Council’s temporary investment returns was significant at around 2.67%.

The use of internal resources in lieu of borrowing has therefore continued to be the most cost effective means of funding capital expenditure, with a projection for £15m to be utilised for this purpose by the end of 2016/17. This has lowered overall treasury risk by reducing both external debt and temporary investments.

The Council acknowledges that this position is not sustainable over the medium term and borrowing options and the timing of such borrowing continue to be assessed, with current expectations that the Council will need to borrow for capital purposes during the year as well as maximising the use of internal borrowing.

4.08 Lender’s Option Borrower’s Option Loans (LOBOs)

The Authority holds £18.95m of LOBO (Lender’s Option Borrower’s Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Authority has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. The option to change the terms on £18.95m of the Council’s LOBOs was not exercised by the lender. The Authority acknowledges there is an element of refinancing risk even though in the current interest rate environment lenders are unlikely to exercise their options.

4.09 Debt Rescheduling

The premium charge for early repayment of PWLB debt remained relatively expensive for the loans in the Authority’s portfolio and therefore unattractive for debt rescheduling activity. No rescheduling activity was undertaken as a consequence.

The Corporate Finance Manager, in conjunction with the Council’s treasury advisors will continue to review any potential opportunities for restructuring the Council’s debt in order to take advantage of potential savings as interest rates change and to enhance the balance of the long term portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).
5.0 INTERIM INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE REPORT

5.01 The Welsh Government’s Investment Guidance gives priority to security and liquidity and the Authority’s aim is to achieve a yield commensurate with these principles.

5.02 The maximum investments the Authority had on deposit at any one time totalled £51.1m. The average investment balance for the period was £36.4m and the average rate of return was 0.51%, generating investment income of £94k.

5.03 Investments have been made with UK banks and building societies up to periods of 185 days (6 months), as well as utilising investment opportunities afforded by money market funds, instant access accounts, Debt Management Office, other Local Authorities and other financial instruments such as Certificates of Deposit (CD’s).

5.04 The average debt balance held was £251.3m and the average rate paid was 5.01%, generating interest payable of £3.578m in line with budget forecasts (to date).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Borrowing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interest rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>received £’000</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Year end projections are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Borrowing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interest rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>received £’000</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>45</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5.05 Credit Risk (security)

Counterparty credit quality was assessed and monitored with reference to credit ratings (the Authority’s minimum long-term counterparty rating for institutions defined as having “high credit quality” is A- across rating agencies Fitch, S&P and Moody’s); credit default swap prices, financial statements, information on potential
government support and reports in the quality financial press.

*Counterparty Update (provided by Arlingclose Ltd)*

Various indicators of credit risk reacted negatively to the result of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. UK bank credit default swaps saw a modest rise but bank share prices fell sharply, on average by 20%, with UK-focused banks experiencing the largest falls. Non-UK bank share prices were not immune although the fall in their share prices was less pronounced.

Fitch downgraded the UK’s sovereign rating by one notch to AA from AA+, and Standard & Poor’s downgraded its corresponding rating by two notches to AA from AAA. Fitch, S&P and Moody’s have a negative outlook on the UK. S&P took similar actions on rail company bonds guaranteed by the UK Government. S&P also downgraded the long-term ratings of the local authorities to which it assigns ratings as well as the long-term rating of the EU from AA+ to AA, the latter on the agency’s view that it lowers the union’s fiscal flexibility and weakens its political cohesion.

Moody’s affirmed the ratings of nine UK banks and building societies but revised the outlook to negative for those that it perceived to be exposed to a more challenging operating environment arising from the ‘leave’ outcome.

There was no immediate change to Arlingclose’s credit advice on UK banks and building societies as a result of the referendum result. Our advisor believes there is a risk that the uncertainty over the UK’s future trading prospects will bring forward the timing of the next UK recession.

The European Banking Authority released the results of its 2016 round of stress tests on the single market’s 51 largest banks after markets closed on Friday 29th July. The stress tests gave a rather limited insight into how large banks might fare under a particular economic scenario. When the tests were designed earlier this year, a 1.7% fall in GDP over three years must have seemed like an outside risk. Their base case of 5.4% growth now looks exceptionally optimistic and the stressed case could be closer to reality. No bank was said to have failed the tests. The Royal Bank of Scotland made headline news as one of the worst performers as its ratios fell by some of the largest amounts, but from a relatively high base. Barclays Bank and Deutsche Bank ended the test with Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratios below the 8% threshold, and would be required to raise more capital should the stressed scenario be realised. The tests support our cautious approach on these banks.

In July Arlingclose completed a review of unrated building societies’ annual financial statements. Cumberland, Harpenden and Vernon Building Society were removed from Arlingclose’s advised list, following a deterioration in credit indicators. The maximum advised maturity was also lowered for eleven societies from 6 months to 100 days due to the uncertainty facing the UK property market
following the EU referendum.

In June Moody’s downgraded Finland from Aaa to Aa1 on its view that Finnish economic growth will remain weak over the coming years, reducing the country’s ability to absorb economic shocks.

Fitch upgraded the long-term rating of ING Bank from A to A+ based on Fitch’s view of the bank’s solid and stable financial metrics and its expectation that that the improvement in earnings will be maintained.

Fitch also upgraded Svenska Handelsbanken’s long-term rating from AA- to AA reflecting the agency’s view that the bank’s earnings and profitability will remain strong, driven by robust income generation, good cost efficiency and low loan impairments.

5.06 *Liquidity*

In keeping with the WG’s Guidance on Investments, the Council maintained a sufficient level of liquidity through the use of Money Market Funds and call accounts.

5.07 *Yield*

The Council sought to optimise returns commensurate with its objectives of security and liquidity. The Council’s investment yield is outlined in 5.02.

6.00 **COMPLIANCE**

6.01 The Council can confirm that it has complied with its Prudential Indicators for the period April to September 2016. These were approved on 16th February 2016 as part of the Council’s 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy.

6.02 In compliance with the requirements of the CIPFA Code of Practice this report provides members with a summary report of the treasury management activity during the period April – September 2016. None of the Prudential Indicators have been breached and a prudent approach has been taking in relation to investment activity with priority being given to security and liquidity over yield.

7.00 **OTHER ITEMS**

7.01 Other treasury management related activity that took place during April – September 2016 includes:

- The Treasury Management Annual Report 2015/16 was reported to Audit
Committee on 13th July 2016. Cabinet and Council reviewed and approved the report in September.

- Quarterly Treasury Management updates were reported to the Audit Committee.
- The Council continues to be a member of the CIPFA Treasury Management Forum and the TM Network Advisory Group.
- In July Internal Audit issued their 2015-16 Audit Report on Treasury Management. Audit Opinion gave a ‘Green’ level of assurance, with just two recommendations.

8.00 CONCLUSION

8.01 In compliance with the requirements of the CIPFA Code of Practice this report provides members with a summary report of the treasury management activity during the first half of 2016/17.

8.02 As indicated in this report none of the Prudential Indicators have been breached and a prudent approach has been taken in relation to investment activity with priority being given to security and liquidity over yield.